Speaking Truth to Power
On Edward Said and the Palestinian Freedom Struggle

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In his 1993 Reith lectures, “Representations of the Intellectual,” Edward Said provided what I consider one of his most important intellectual contributions. In the lecture “Speaking Truth to Power,” Said pondered “how the intellectual confronts the question of power and authority” to make the point that the task of the intellectual qua intellectual cannot properly be fulfilled under the corrupting influence of self-interest beholden to such elements. Although intellectuals necessarily possess beliefs, loyalties, and affiliations that are shaped by the societies of which they are a part, and in that way are no different from most other individuals, Said held that intellectuals differ from others in the felt need to constantly question power and to challenge its use to further the narrow interests of the few who wield it, usually at the expense of various minorities or voiceless outsiders. Power and authority, in this sense, include the political/nationalist establishment, mainstream media, religious order, and corporate interest, among other things, and it is the imperative of the intellectual to maintain an arms-length from these influences in order to fulfill what is essentially a contrarian role in society.

When the intellectual succumbs to the pull of such forces, however, hypocrisy becomes the order of the day, and the resulting conflict of interest casts a long shadow over much of his or her work. Said denounced such hypocrisy as a plague on the intellectual, deriding the propensity of those whose cultural chauvinism, for instance, leads them to “pontificate about abuses in someone else’s society and to excuse exactly the same practices in one’s own.” Citing Alexis de Tocqueville as “a classic example of this”—we are told that the nineteenth-century French intellectual was not as given to criticizing his own government’s persecution of Algerian Muslims in the 1830s and 1840s as he was to criticizing America’s abuse of native
Americans and African slaves—Said argued that the “inevitable conclusion” for the intellectual is “that if you wish to uphold basic human justice you must do so for everyone, not just selectively for the people that your side, your culture, your nation designates as okay.” For Said, true intellectuals could never be “fawning” servants of power and interest but rather should be persons with “an alternative and more principled stand that enables them in effect to speak the truth to power,” the personal consequences be damned.

The exhortation to speak truth to power was essentially Said’s motto in public life, and as one of the twentieth century’s most profound public intellectuals, he was its standard bearer par excellence. One of his great contributions was to affirm, not merely through his writings but by personal example, that we all have more than a passing role to play in holding power and authority to account. Nowhere was this belief more evident than in the enormous energy he invested in the cause of justice and freedom in Palestine. Over four decades, Said stood out as one of the most eloquent and forceful voices for the Palestinian people and its quest for liberation. Because of what he described as the “complete hegemonic coalescence between the liberal Western view of things and the Zionist-Israeli view,” Said always maintained (and denounced the fact) that Palestine’s case was uniquely one in which “fear of speaking out about one of the greatest injustices in modern history has hobbled, blinkered, [and] muzzled many who know the truth and are in a position to serve it.” Said chose the alternative course, emphasizing that “despite the abuse and vilification that any outspoken supporter of Palestinian rights and self-determination earns for him or herself, the truth deserves to be spoken.”

Looking back on his work on Palestine, one can discern three (among many, I hasten to add) distinctive roles that Said played in advancing the discourse on the subject. First, he had an enormous impact as a narrator of the contemporary Palestinian experience. Perhaps the most marked feature of his contribution was his stubborn insistence that the Palestinian people be addressed on their own terms and that they be acknowledged by the world at large as a people possessing agency and the capacity, like all other peoples, to represent themselves. Second, Said was an exemplary critic of power, not only of Zionist and Western power but also of Arab and Palestinian power. One of the testaments to the character of the man was his absolute refusal to allow his own identity and affiliations to confine his thoughts or cloud his judgment when he saw a need to criticize leaders, particularly those within his own communities, whether Arab or American. Third, Said played an important role as a visionary, for he was able to foresee, long before most, various solutions for bringing about a just and lasting peace between Palestinians and Israelis. Viewed with hindsight, these solutions now seem axiomatic to many scholars, activists, and policy makers familiar with the conflict. The common theme in these three roles was that Said took very seriously his position as an intellectual and the concomitant duty imposed on him to speak the truth to power.
SAID AS NARRATOR

The importance of a people asserting their collective voice in representing themselves in the public domain, whether in cultural, social, economic or political fora, and particularly in the case of a colonized, oppressed or subjugated people, was a subject that preoccupied the great South African antipartheid activist Steve Biko. In treating the subject of Black Consciousness in 1971, he explained to fellow antipartheid activists that his philosophy had very much “to do with correcting false images” of black Africans “in terms of our culture, education, religion [and] economics,” and that “there is always an interplay between the history of a people, i.e. the past, and their faith in themselves and hopes for their future.”

In noting that the privileged “whites can only see us from the outside and as such can never extract and analyse the ethos in the black community,” Biko counseled that black South Africans “must therefore work out schemes not only to correct this, but further *to be our own authorities rather than wait to be interpreted by others.*” Of course, in the South Africa of his day, Biko’s ideas posed a considerable threat to the apartheid system and the worldview it stood for. With such thoughts banned from expression of any kind by the ruling authorities, they were uttered by Biko at great peril, as was tragically confirmed by his brutal murder at the age of thirty while in South African police detention after conviction under the now-infamous Terrorism Act. That Biko persisted in preaching Black Consciousness in the face of substantial threats to his personal well-being, however, speaks volumes of the courage sometimes required in daring to represent the oppressed and those whom the powers that be would just as soon wish away or dismiss as nonpersons, subhuman, simply not like “us.”

That Biko’s example was well understood by Said was evident in the manner in which he represented the Palestinian people and its enduring struggle for freedom. In the context of that struggle, the issue of representation has been central and generally shaped by two distinct but related paradigms, both characterized by an attempt to impose a master narrative on Palestinians: one focused on effacing the reality of Palestine and its people; another on portraying Palestinians in such negative terms as to cast doubt on their very humanity and thereby render them unworthy of consideration. Said took serious issue with both of these paradigms and regarded them as major contributing factors that helped rationalize the actual effacement of much of Palestine in 1948 and the continuous subjugation of the Palestinian people thereafter. To him, they were to be treated as challenges that had to be met with an effective counternarrative if Palestine and its people were to continue to exist in the historical record at all, let alone reconstitute themselves as a nation in their native land.

The first of these is what one may call an “imperial paradigm.” This paradigm was shaped by the Palestinian encounter with European imperialism in the first half of the twentieth century and by the international order it spawned in the quarter century after World War II. A marked feature of this encounter was that the inter-
national system “divided peoples into different levels of ‘civilization’ according to which international legal rights were awarded to those regarded as most advanced.”

A stark example of this was article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, concluded at the Paris Peace Conference on 28 April 1919, which provided that the "well-being and development" of the peoples of the former colonies of the defeated Axis powers formed “a sacred trust of civilization.”

Under article 22, because such peoples “were not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world,” the League established the mandate system in order that their “tutelage” could “be entrusted to advanced nations.”

As for the colonies and territories formerly administered by the Ottoman Empire, including Palestine, article 22 provided that they had “reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory [power] until such time as they are able to stand alone.”

While it is true that article 22 bears tremendous import for having provisionally recognized the political independence of Palestine at a time when Zionist settlers constituted a very small minority of the population of the country, the unmistakable paternalism and contempt expressed by the Great Powers through it toward the Palestinians as people not "yet able to stand by themselves," not capable of confronting “the strenuous conditions of the modern world,” and therefore requiring the “tutelage” of “advanced nations,” were matters that helped propagate a narrative of effacement that deeply troubled Said.

The following passage from *The Question of Palestine* is demonstrative:

> All the transformative projects for Palestine, including Zionism, have rationalized the denial of present reality in Palestine with some argument about a "higher" (or better, more worthy, more modern, more fitting; the comparatives are almost infinite) interest, cause or mission. These "higher" things entitle their proponents not only to claim that the natives of Palestine, such as they are, are not worth considering and therefore nonexistent; they also feel entitled to claim that the natives of Palestine, and Palestine itself, have been superseded definitively, transformed completely and beyond recall, and this even while those same natives have been demonstrating exactly the opposite. Here again the Arab Palestinian has been pitted against an undeniably superior antagonist whose consciousness of himself and of the Palestinian is exactly, positionally, superior."

Through such reflections, Said not only denounced the callous worldview of imperial Europe toward the Oriental Other but also helped deconstruct the dominant narrative of the international system and the state-centered legal and political order upon which it had been based. Despite centuries of lived history, this system continued to regard non-Europeans them as subservient natives unworthy of standing in the “modern world.”

Another obvious example of this denigration is the Balfour Declaration of 2 No-
vember 1917, by which the Zionist movement secured a commitment from the British government to help establish a “Jewish national home” in Palestine: “His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.” Of course, at the time the declaration was issued, Great Britain had no sovereignty or control over Palestine, the country still being under the administrative control of the Ottoman Empire. But the violation of the nemo dat principle aside, this historical fact mattered little to the colonial culture that shaped, influenced, and imposed a narrative in which Palestine and Palestinians were simply rubbed out. Palestine’s indigenous Arabs then accounted for roughly 92 percent of the country’s population, “facts about which there could be no debate,” as Said often put it. Nevertheless, Lord Balfour chose to obfuscate reality by referring to them as the “existing non-Jewish” community, as though they, not the Zionist settlers for whom the declaration was issued, constituted the minority. One is here reminded of Said’s observation that language is “a highly organized and encoded system which employs many devices” to express “not ‘truth’ but representations,” which are ultimately informed by the “culture, institutions, and political ambience of the representor.” That such was the case with Balfour’s choice of language was a matter he himself felt little compunction admitting. In a memorandum to Lord Curzon dated 11 August 1919, Balfour stated, “In Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country…. The four great powers are committed to Zionism and Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long tradition, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desire and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.”

For Said, more than the declaration itself, it was the idea behind Balfour’s decision to issue it that was cause for great concern. Said viewed the declaration “as part of a history, of a style and set of characteristics centrally constituting the question of Palestine as it can be discussed even today,” and he lamented the fact that this “style” took “for granted the higher right of a colonial power to dispose of territory as it saw fit.” In doing so, Said encouraged the re-presentation of the Palestinians into history, as living, breathing subjects whose very existence as a nation was being plotted against for the sake of “age long traditions” not in the least bit related to them. He rejected the “brute, politically manipulated disproportions between natives and non-natives” made acceptable by the “rationale” of men like Balfour—namely that Zionism “as a superior idea to that of sheer number and presence [i.e. of indigenous Palestinians] ought to rule in Palestine.”

Other examples of the imperial paradigm continued to emerge long after the de-
mise of British power and the onset of the age of human and peoples’ rights in the post–World War II era. Indeed, it was in the “postcolonial world” that “elements of the old order through which the West assume[d] a centrality against the periphery of the ex-colonies” were replicated in the international institutions that evolved.24 The U.N. General Assembly’s recommended partition of Palestine in 1947, whereby the one-third Jewish-settler minority was granted approximately 57 percent of the territory of Palestine, leaving only 43 percent for the indigenous Palestinian two-thirds majority, was such an example.25 Another was U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, which affirmed the principles of “a just and lasting peace in the Middle East,” including the achievement of “a just settlement of the refugee problem,” meaning, of course, the Palestinian refugee problem.26 But Said’s deconstruction of the resolution, with its master narrative of Palestinian nonexistence (how could “anonymous refugees” have any real national rights? he wondered), helped us identify what was essentially a repackaging of the old imperial system in the garb of the “enlightened” new world order.27 If, as Said noted, “by the end of the seventies there was not a progressive political cause that did not identify with the Palestinian movement,” it could only have been due to the emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 and the subsequent introduction of a Palestinian counternarrative during the decolonization period. From that point forward, Palestinians were to “be their own authorities,” as Biko put it, and Said would play a direct role in shaping the narrative of their national liberation movement as a member of its “parliament in exile,” the Palestine National Council (PNC), from 1977 to 1991.

A second phenomenon that has shaped how the Palestinians and their freedom struggle have been represented is what one may call the “Zionist paradigm.” In The Question of Palestine, Said explained:

What we must again see is the issue involving representation, an issue always lurking near the question of Palestine. I said earlier that Zionism always undertakes to speak for Palestine and the Palestinians; this has always meant a blocking operation, by which the Palestinian cannot be heard from (or represent himself) directly on the world stage. Just as the expert Orientalist believed that only he could speak (paternally as it were) for the natives and primitive societies that he had studied—his presence denoting their absence—so too the Zionists spoke to the world on behalf of the Palestinians.28

This point was central to Said’s understanding of the Palestine problem, and he always sought to affirm, in one form or another, that from their earliest encounters with political Zionism, the Palestinians were the object of a conscious effort to strip them of the right to narrate their own politics, their own history, even their own existence. For if such an existence were acknowledged in any manner, it would be impossible for Zionism to reconcile its own master narrative of a scattered, pio-
neering, victimized people answering the call to “redeem” a desolate “land no one wanted.” As Said noted, “In order to mitigate the presence of large numbers of natives on a desired land, the Zionists convinced themselves that these natives did not exist, then made it possible for them to exist only in the most rarefied forms.”

One of the earliest examples of such representations was the Zionist slogan that Palestine was a “land without a people for a people without a land,” a myth propagated by Israel Zangwill, a contemporary of Theodor Herzl, Zionism’s “founding father.” Nur Masalha, one of today’s leading Palestinian historians, has noted that the land-without-a-people myth “not only justified Zionist settlement but also helped to suppress conscience-pricking among Israeli Jews for the dispossession of the Palestinians before, during and after 1948: if the ‘land had been empty, then no Zionist wrongdoing had taken place.” As Masalha notes, “For the Zionist settler who is coming to ‘redeem the land’ the indigenous people earmarked for dispossession are usually invisible.” In Culture and Resistance, Said concurred (“We are an invisible people”) and added anecdotally that for many Israelis, “it is a very difficult thought to accept, that you are there not because you’re a great, heroic figure escaping the Holocaust, but you are there largely at the expense of another person who you’ve displaced or killed or driven away.”

Another example is former Israeli prime minister Golda Meir’s 1969 exclamation that “it was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them: they did not exist.” In The Politics of Dispossession, Said noted that after Meir had “set the general tone” with this statement, he viewed his “most specific task . . . to make the case for Palestinian presence, to say that there was a Palestinian people and that, like all others, it had a history, a society, and, most important, a right to self-determination.” “In other words,” as he put it, “to try to change the public consciousness in which Palestine had no presence at all.” Of course, the “public consciousness” that most concerned Said in this respect was that of the West, particularly in the United States, where popular ignorance of the Palestinians and their plight had become widespread in the decades following Meir’s fabrication. As a Palestinian American, Said was particularly troubled by this, as demonstrated in the following passage from Orientalism: “The life of an Arab Palestinian in the West, particularly in America, is disheartening. There exists here an almost unanimous consensus that politically he does not exist, and when it is allowed that he does, it is either as a nuisance or as an Oriental. The web of racism, cultural stereotypes, political imperialism, dehumanizing ideology holding the Arab or the Muslim is very strong indeed, and it is this web which every Palestinian has come to feel as his uniquely punishing destiny.” It is noteworthy that Said’s “own experiences” in dealing with this destiny in part led to his writing Orientalism, by all accounts his most influential work. In doing so, he helped illustrate the effect
to which deconstructionist methodologies could be put in countering narratives imposed on peoples for whom power purports to speak.

Where the Zionist master narrative could not rely on effacement to deal with the Palestinians, it turned to dehumanization. Said lamented the record of unspeakable denigrations of the Palestinians as “two-legged vermin,” “drugged roaches in a bottle,” and “grasshoppers” who must be “crushed,” as well as the more frequent references to the Palestinians as a “demographic threat” and “ticking bomb” commonly found in mainstream Israeli media today. One of the more politically damaging representations in this narrative has been the image of the Palestinian as “terrorist,” a representation that has persisted for decades and has gained increased currency from events in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory (OPT) since the outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000, as well as from the so-called global war on terror that erupted following the 11 September 2001 attack on the United States. In Blaming the Victims, Said exposed the rationale for incorporating the charge of “terror” or “terrorism” into the master narrative: “The main thing is to isolate your enemy from time, from causality, from prior action, and thereby to portray him or her as ontologically and gratuitously interested in wreaking havoc for its own sake.”

Using this formula, the Palestinian “terrorist,” acting only out of a primordial desire to kill, is much easier to condemn, denounce, and eschew as anathema to order, liberty, and freedom—essentially to “our” way of life. In The Politics of Dispossession, Said continued, “The very indiscriminateness of terrorism, actual and described, its tautological and circular character, is antinarrative. Sequence, the logic of cause and effect as between oppressors and victims, opposing pressures—all these vanish inside an enveloping cloud called ‘terrorism.’”

Said’s counternarrative offers a method to roundly condemn taking advantage of the vague and nebulous character of the term terror to “justify everything ‘we’ do and to delegitimize as well as dehumanize everything ‘they’ do.” It forces all concerned to ask the harder if not obvious question “why” before judging the other for resorting to violence. At the same time, it does not accept or justify violence for its own sake or for political ends, and it absolutely rejects the use of all forms of violence by anyone against civilians or noncombatants anywhere.

Beyond countering the representations rooted in imperialist and Zionist discourse, though, Said regarded the Palestinian people and its struggle for freedom as symbolic of a more universal, human struggle against oppression, injustice, and exploitation. This view added a valuable element to the counternarrative that he helped cultivate and that continues to be a prominent feature of the discourse of the disenfranchised the world over. For Said, the global appeal of the Palestinian cause was a direct result of the link between European colonialism and the rise of Zionism in the late nineteenth century, both of which “appealed to a European audience for whom the classification of overseas territories and natives into various uneven classes was canonical and ‘natural.’” That is why,” Said wrote, “every sin-
gle state or movement in the formerly colonized territories of Africa and Asia today identifies with, fully supports, and understands the Palestinian struggle." But shared historical experience was not the only reason for Said’s conception of Palestine as a concept far greater than itself. Ironically, for him, Palestine’s status as a festering colonial problem in the age of the so-called postcolony, neglected and protracted, rendered its allegorical value all the more poignant. Said saw Palestine as more than a freedom struggle capable of capturing the popular imagination; he also saw it as a door to a brighter future for us all:

No one who has given his energies to being a partisan has ever doubted that “Palestine” has loosened a great number of other issues as well. The word has become a symbol for struggle against social injustice…. There is an awareness in the nonwhite world that the tendency of modern politics to rule over masses of people as transferable, silent, and politically neutral populations has a specific illustration in what has happened to the Palestinians—and what in different ways is happening to the citizens of newly independent, formerly colonial territories ruled over by antidemocratic army regimes. The idea of resistance gets content and muscle from Palestine; more usefully, resistance gets detail and a positively new approach to the microphysics of oppression from Palestine. If we think of Palestine as having the function of both a place to be returned to and of an entirely new place, a vision partially of a restored past and of a novel future, perhaps even a historical disaster transformed into hope for a different future, we will understand the word’s meaning better.46

I think that this aspect of Palestine had the greatest resonance for Said, perhaps because he was the quintessential exile, a citizen of the world, a product of far more than Palestine itself. In the end, this internationalist, universalist, secular, humanist outlook on Palestine and its potential was one of the most important elements of Said’s counternarrative on the place, its people, and its cause.

SAID AS CRITIC

A natural outgrowth of Said’s exhortation to speak truth to power was the role he assumed in public life as power’s consummate critic. If speaking truth to power was the reason for illuminating subaltern narratives and presence, holding power’s agents, their intentions and methods up to public scrutiny was necessary to carve out the space for accounting for such narratives in their own right. In the context of the Palestinian freedom struggle, Said devoted considerable energy to a critical reading and understanding of Zionism. For him, Zionism was more than an abstract ideal that called for the creation of a “body corporate” of the Jews in Palestine, to use Theodor Herzl’s term; it was the product of a certain historical context and a set of values and forces that had consequences, not only for its Jewish adherents but also for the non-Jewish natives of the place. Zionism coveted, colonized, and eventually transformed.47 In The Question of Palestine, Said devoted a full chap-
ter to deconstructing Zionism from “the standpoint of its victims,” and he begins the chapter with the following important observation:

It is frequently argued that such an idea as Zionism, for all its political tribulations and the struggles on its behalf, is at bottom an unchanging idea that expresses the yearning for Jewish political and religious self-determination—for Jewish national selfhood—to be exercised on the promised land. Because Zionism seems to have culminated in the creation of the state of Israel, it is also argued that the historical realization of the idea confirms its unchanging essence and, no less important, the means used for its realization. Very little is said about what Zionism entailed for non-Jews who happened to have encountered it; for that matter, nothing is said about where (outside Jewish history) it took place, and from what in the historical context of nineteenth-century Europe Zionism drew its force. To the Palestinian, for whom Zionism was somebody else’s idea imported into Palestine and for which in a very concrete way he or she was made to pay and suffer, these forgotten things about Zionism are the very things that are centrally important.48

Thus, for Said, Zionism was more than an emancipatory idea for persecuted European Jewry, a fact he readily acknowledged. Rather, it was Zionism’s simultaneous affiliation with, organic connection to, European imperialism and colonialism that mattered the most, an appreciation of which was required if a full and fair understanding of the idea was at all possible.49 Of course, Said was not the first to identify this aspect of Zionism; Walid Khalidi and Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, among others, had done so years earlier.50 However, he deconstructed and articulated it in a more critical fashion than anyone before him.

His formula was set out in The Question of Palestine, where he counseled the importance of examining “effective political ideas like Zionism” from both a genealogical standpoint (“in order that their provenance, their kinship and descent, their affiliation both with other ideas and with political institutions may be demonstrated”) and from a practical standpoint (as a system of “accumulation of power, land, ideological legitimacy” on the one hand, and “displacement of people, other ideas, prior legitimacy,” on the other).51 It was this contextual, multilayered, epistemological approach to understanding Zionism as an idea that was the hallmark of his role as one of its most public critics. For him, no idea, movement, culture, or civilization could be understood in simple terms, and he was greatly troubled by the tendency of many self-styled intellectuals to essentialize and simplify Zionism’s relationship with its Palestinian Other (Zionism was essentially “good,” whereas Palestinians were essentially “bad”).52

One particularly demonstrative example of this is to be found in an interview given by prominent Israeli “New Historian” Benny Morris to Ari Shavit of the Israeli daily Haaretz on 9 January 2004.53 Morris, of course, gained notoriety with the 1987 publication of The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949, in which he defini-
tively demonstrated, among other things, that the Palestinians had been expelled and/or forced to flee during the 1948 war by Zionist forces.\textsuperscript{54} Corroborating much of the Palestinian historical narrative, Morris’s revelations earned him the unwanted opprobrium and eventual boycott of much of the Israeli academic establishment. Following the 2004 printing of the revised edition of his seminal work, Morris told \textit{Haaretz} that further research into Israel Defense Force archives had revealed that “there were far more Israeli acts of massacre” during the 1948 war “than I had previously thought” . . . To my surprise, there were also many cases of rape,” a “large proportion” of which “ended with [the] murder” of the Palestinian victims.\textsuperscript{55} Notwithstanding these harrowing findings, the following exchange between Morris and Shavit reveals the extent to which power and the ideas that fuel it, in this case Zionism from the standpoint of Morris, essentializes its victims and can be regarded by its adherents as important enough to justify even the darkest of deeds:

\textbf{Shavit:} Benny Morris, for decades you have been researching the dark side of Zionism. You are an expert on the atrocities of 1948. In the end, do you in effect justify all this? Are you an advocate of the transfer of 1948?

\textbf{Morris:} There is no justification for acts of rape. There is no justification for acts of massacre. Those are war crimes. But in certain conditions, expulsion is not a war crime. I don’t think that the expulsions of 1948 were war crimes. You can’t make an omelet without breaking eggs. You have to dirty your hands.

\textbf{Shavit:} We are talking about the killing of thousands of people, the destruction of an entire society.

\textbf{Morris:} A society that aims to kill you forces you to destroy it. When the choice is between destroying or being destroyed, it’s better to destroy.

\textbf{Shavit:} There is something chilling about the quiet way in which you say that.

\textbf{Morris:} If you expected me to burst into tears, I’m sorry to disappoint you. I will not do that.

\textbf{Shavit:} So when the commanders of Operation Dani [an Israeli military operation in which thousands of Palestinians were ethnically cleansed from their homes by Zionist forces in 1948] are standing there and observing the long and terrible column of the 50,000 people expelled from Lod [sic] walking eastward, you stand there with them? You justify them?

\textbf{Morris:} I definitely understand them. I understand their motives. I don’t think they felt any pangs of conscience, and in their place I wouldn’t have felt pangs of conscience. \textit{Without that act, they would not have won the war and the state would not have come into being.}

\textbf{Shavit:} You do not condemn them morally?

\textbf{Morris:} No.

\textbf{Shavit:} They perpetrated ethnic cleansing.

\textbf{Morris:} There are circumstances in history that justify ethnic cleansing. I know that
this term is completely negative in the discourse of the twenty-first century, but when the choice is between ethnic cleansing and genocide—the annihilation of your people—I prefer ethnic cleansing.

Shavit: And that was the situation in 1948?
Morris: That was the situation. That is what Zionism faced. A Jewish state would not have come into being without the uprooting of 700,000 Palestinians. Therefore it was necessary to uproot them. There was no choice but to expel that population. It was necessary to cleanse the hinterland and cleanse the border areas and cleanse the main roads. It was necessary to cleanse the villages from which our convoys and our settlements were fired on.

Shavit: The term “to cleanse” is terrible.
Morris: I know it doesn’t sound nice but that’s the term they used at the time. I adopted it from all the 1948 documents in which I am immersed.

Shavit: What you are saying is hard to listen to and hard to digest. You sound hard-hearted.
Morris: I feel sympathy for the Palestinian people, which truly underwent a hard tragedy. I feel sympathy for the refugees themselves. But if the desire to establish a Jewish state here is legitimate, there was no other choice.56

Difficult though it may be, let us leave aside Morris’s supposed sympathy for the Palestinian people. For our limited purposes, only the following of his claims is relevant: that in 1948 the ethnic cleansing of the vast majority of Palestine’s indigenous Christian and Muslim Arab inhabitants by Zionist forces was completely justified, indeed required, so that Zionism could fulfill its goal of establishing a Jewish state in that land. In The Question of Palestine, a full twenty-five years before Morris made his startling proclamations, Said helped us understand power’s propensity to justify the unjustifiable by examining what Zionism meant for its Palestinian victims. Referring first to a passage in Heart of Darkness (where Conrad writes, “The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much . . . What redeems it is the idea only; an idea at the back of it; not a sentimental pretence but an idea—something you can set up, and bow down before, and offer a sacrifice to”),57 Said makes the following observation:

The power to conquer territory is only in part a matter of physical force: there is the strong moral and intellectual component making the conquest itself secondary to an idea, which dignifies (and indeed hastens) pure force with arguments drawn from science, morality, ethics and a general philosophy. Everything in Western culture potentially capable of dignifying the acquisition of new domains—as a new science, for example, acquires new intellectual territory for itself—could be put at the service of colonial adventures. And was put, the “idea” always informing the conquest, making it entirely palatable.58
And so it was through an analysis of the idea of Zionism and its provenance, that Said offered an alternative understanding of why, how, and on what grounds its adherents used it to justify their treatment of the Palestinians, rendering all of its practical effects for them, no matter how unspeakable and tragic, perfectly acceptable and palatable to the conscience. Between Conrad and Morris, the power of an idea, in this case the idea of Zionism, is laid bare; it is, alas, a trump card to be played over all other considerations. What Said’s reading enabled was the deconstruction of Zionism first as an idea and second as a system aimed at the actual effacement of Palestine and the subsequent creation of Israel in its place. But his analysis can apply to virtually every act the state of Israel undertakes in respect of the Palestinian people to this day. Take, for example, the expropriation of Palestinian land, or the construction of the wall in the West Bank, or the erection of Jewish-only settlements and bypass roads in the OPT, or the imprisonment without charge or trial of Palestinian detainees, or the extrajudicial killing of stone-throwing Palestinian youth. All these actions are manifestations of modern Zionism’s interaction with its Palestinian Other; taken separately, viewed in a vacuum, one can justify each of them to varying degrees, as is done regularly by Israeli government officials or supporters of Israel, as necessary to keep Israel and the Jewish people “secure.” But what Said offered, with his critical reading not only of Zionism’s acts but more importantly of Zionism as an idea, was a framework for viewing such acts through the prism of its victims, a way to see continuity in the treatment of these victims—not because Israel requires security, nor because Palestinians are terrorists, but finally because if Zionism as an idea is in the end worth anything, such acts are necessarily justified, even required.59

But of course, Said’s role as critic did not stop at Zionism or Israel. Anyone familiar with his writings on Palestine knows he was equally intent on calling American power to account, in particular for the role that successive U.S. administrations had played in the conflict.60 To be sure, Said never let his criticism of American foreign policy in the Middle East cloud his understanding and appreciation of the complexity of American history, culture, and society. But he was tenacious and fearless in taking a stand against what he saw as unabashed American duplicity in its support for Israeli policies against the Palestinian people, not to mention U.S. support for numerous autocratic regimes in the Arab world. As someone who intimately understood the global appeal and power of American “ideals” (I concede that the construct is distinctly anti-Saidian), Said decried the U.S. tendency to pursue policies of democracy at home and dictatorship abroad in the Middle East. Following the method and approach of Noam Chomsky, Said always took great pains to illustrate to his American audience his view that U.S. foreign policy was not only bad for the Palestinians and, ultimately, for Israel, but also inherently anti-American and supremely counterproductive for American interests in the region. In Culture and Resistance, he put it thus:
I think that most Arabs and Muslims feel that the United States hasn’t really been paying much attention to their desires, but has been pursuing its policies for its own sake, without much in the way of explanation or attempts to somehow justify them. And above all, pursuing these policies not according to many of the principles that the United States proclaims are its own: democracy, self-determination, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and its commitment to international law. It is very hard, for example, to justify the thirty-four-year-old occupation of the West Bank and Gaza—140 Israeli settlements and roughly 400,000 settlers brought with the support and financing of the United States—and say this is part of U.S. adherence to international law and U.N. resolutions. So all of this is a record that keeps building up in an area in which—and here we come now to the really sad part—the rulers have been supported by the United States against the wishes of the people. And there is a general sense in which the United States is flouting its own principles in order to maintain such governments and regimes in power and really have very little to do with the large number of people who are dominated by these regimes.61

Of course, through his writings Said frequently noted that the American approach to the region bore no small resemblance to the imperial policies pursued by Britain and France in the first half of the twentieth century. The conflict between British legal obligations to the Palestinians under the Covenant of the League of Nations and British promises to the Zionists in the Balfour Declaration is one such example. Another is the manner in which Britain and France surreptitiously dismembered the ailing Ottoman Empire into spheres of influence through the infamous Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916, the obvious (not to mention anomalous) contours of which remain with us to this day. The main difference between American power and that of its British and French progenitors was in the level of its sophistication, itself a product of its contemporaneous emergence with the age of human rights and information—both considerable impediments to the more raw exercise of power characteristic of centuries past, and thereby requiring a developed expertise in the Machiavellian use of image, language, and ideas. Said’s criticism of America’s exercise of power in dealing with the Palestinian problem was important because of his ability to identify and deconstruct its “neo-imperial” penchant for deploying a sort of Orwellian doublespeak to mask the real intent and effect of American policy in the region. In The Politics of Dispossession, Said observed that “one of the most ominous developments in the Middle East since the era of avowedly secret agreements by the powers on the disposition of spheres of influence has been the rise of a public policy consisting of the traditional Realpolitik but incorporating the terminology of a liberal mutual interest, respect, and assistance platform against extremism and disorder; even as the far less evident underside of that platform is a thoroughly ruthless instrument for quashing or containing the slightest social restiveness or protest.”62

Using this framework, Said offered a critical view of how the considerable moral
force of such important ideas as “freedom,” “liberty,” “democracy,” and most important for our purposes, “peace” had been turned on its head to explain in as altruistic terms as possible a policy that is in effect the antithesis of those ideas. The net effect of this vernacular of “liberal mutual interest,” as Said termed it, has been to silence dissent, for if one is against the policies of America and its friends in the region, one necessarily finds oneself pitted against liberty, freedom, democracy, and peace.

This deconstruction of American foreign policy in respect of the Palestine problem was most evident in Said’s writings in the years following the 1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Governing Arrangements (DOP) between Israel and the PLO and the onset of the now-defunct Oslo “peace” process. Contrary to what mainstream political pundits in London, New York, Paris, and Washington portrayed as the dawn of a new era, Said argued was in fact a drastic turn for the worse—a “Palestinian Versailles,” fashioned and supported by “incompetent” Palestinian leaders and “dishonest” Israeli and American negotiators. 53 Under Oslo, Israel and the PLO undertook to conclude a number of interim agreements over a five-year period (1993–99) that would lead to a final settlement of their conflict based on the “land-for-peace” formula outlined in U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). Whereas the basis of the Oslo process was the PLO’s recognition of “the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security,” the government of Israel offered little more than recognition of “the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people,” stopping short of express recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination in a state of their own or of the then twenty-six-year-old military occupation of the OPT, with its attendant destruction of Palestinian lives and property. 61 Instead, the Oslo process centered on the creation of a quasi-autonomous Palestinian Authority (PA), established to administer selected local and civil affairs for the majority of the Palestinian population in the OPT (taxation, education, health, etc.), which was itself divided into three separate jurisdictions, Areas “A,” “B” and “C.” 65 At no point during the Oslo years did the PAs limited authority extend beyond the various noncontiguous portions of Areas A and B (amounting to just over 21 percent of the total area of the OPT, or just 5 percent of the total area of historical Palestine). 66 At the time of this writing, it is questionable whether these areas continue to exist in practical terms, having been run over by Israel’s military offensive in March 2002 and effectively kept under siege ever since. 67 In contrast, and notwithstanding a commitment in Oslo that “neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of permanent status negotiations,” since 1993, Israel has more than doubled the number of its settlers in the OPT through continued construction of illegal Jewish settlements, bypass roads, and, most recently, the wall in the West Bank (declared illegal by the International Court of Justice in July 2004). 68 With these actions, Israel has consolidated its control
over the area, with no discernible reduction in support from the United States. In fact, U.S. support intensified during the Second Intifada, which has caused unprecedented levels of Palestinian suffering, including through the Israeli imposition of a regime of siege, curfew, and closure on the besieged Bantustan-like enclaves in which the Palestinians have effectively been corralled since 1993. The result: over 4,900 Palestinians and 1,000 Israelis killed; over 31,500 Palestinians and 6,800 Israelis injured; and a Palestinian economic recession described by the World Bank as “among the worst in modern history,” with unemployment increasing from 10 percent in September 2000 to an average of 41 percent during 2002, and the number of Palestinians living below the poverty line of $2 per day during the same period rising from 20 percent to over 50 percent of the population; in the Gaza Strip alone during the same period, “unemployment exceeded 46 percent of the workforce and the poverty level rose to 68 percent.” Israel's September 2005 withdrawal of its approximately 8,000 settlers from the Gaza Strip has not resulted in any major improvement of the socioeconomic or human security of Gaza's population, nor incidentally, has it ended Israeli occupation.

It is in this general context that Said questioned the meaning of the term peace as bandied about by the United States and its “junior partner,” particularly during the Oslo years. In Peace and Its Discontents, he lamented that “American ‘peace’ in the Middle East” has meant “the subordination of all regional and local issues to the United States” and its interests, which he saw as effectively identical to those of Israel in the conflict between Zionism and the Palestinians. In From Oslo to Iraq and the Road Map, Said bemoaned that for years “the United States has underwritten Israel's intransigence and brutality” in the form of “$92 billion and unending political support, all for the world to see”; “ironically,” he wrote, this support was far stronger “during, rather than either before or after, the Oslo process.” His analysis of the positions the United States took during the Oslo process called into serious question Washington's self-styled designation as the “honest broker” between Israel and the Palestinians, the duplicity of which was symbolized, in Said's view, by the presence in the Clinton and Bush II administrations of a “small cabal of individuals, all of them unelected and therefore unresponsive to public pressure,” many with well-known public ties to the Zionist lobby in the United States or otherwise known as staunch public supporters of Israel. Although these people—men such as Martin Indyk and Dennis Ross, among others—did not for Said “symbolize a conspiracy,” they personified for him “an aggressively unbroken continuity in U.S. Middle East Policy” that had to be called to account if justice was to be achieved for all involved. In the context of the Oslo process, this continuity manifested itself in, for instance, the automatic support Israel received from the United States for Prime Minister Ehud Barak's so-called “generous offers” at the Camp David Summit of July 2000, as well as in the parameters President Clinton put forth at Taba in January 2001. In commenting on Clinton's proposals (calling them a “warmed-
over Israeli intention to perpetuate control over Palestinian lives and land for the foreseeable future”), Said criticized their “underlying premise” that “Israel needs protection from Palestinians, not the other way around.”79 This premise, Said emphasized, was something that has informed and continues to inform official American approaches to the conflict up to the present, the “vision” of President George W. Bush as outlined in the so-called Middle East road map being no exception. That document, vague as it is, is still heavily imbued with the notion that it is democratic Israel, not the dispossessed, colonized, militarily occupied Palestinians, that is under constant military attack and therefore in need of peace and security. As Said noted in respect of the road map, “the real onus is placed on the Palestinians . . . who must keep coming up with the goods in rapid succession” (e.g., PA “reform,” end to “Palestinian violence,” “incitement,” etc.), “while the military occupation remains more or less in place,” with Israel in full control.80 According to this “vision,” the problem is not Israeli dispossession, colonization, or occupation of Palestinians or their land, but rather Palestinian “corruption,” “violence,” and “terror,” which must be put to an end before the Israelis can return to negotiations with the Palestinians—in essence, before “peace” can be achieved. In this sense, one might view the road map as an obvious throwback to the American “rejectionist” approach to “peace” in the Middle East (to borrow a notion from Chomsky) prevalent in the 1970s and 1980s. This approach rejected negotiations with the PLO, rejected Palestinian statehood, and rejected even the slightest pressuring of Israel to end its occupation or construction of settlements in the OPT, let alone an acknowledgment of its responsibility for the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem.81 In the end, Said’s criticism of official American approaches to “peace” confirmed the need for Israelis and Palestinians to move beyond the doublespeak—that “liberal mutual interest” must line up against “extremism and disorder”—to make an honest and principled commitment simply to do justice to others based on universal standards of law and morality.

Importantly, this call of Said’s did not stop with his criticism of Zionism and the United States. It was just as evident in his scathing treatment of leaders and governments in the Arab world. As a fiercely secular liberal who had for many reasons been disaffected by the general malaise of the contemporary Arab Middle East, particularly in the years after the fall of Palestine and the decolonization period, he spent considerable energy commenting upon and criticizing its leaders and governing ethos in the Arabic-language press. As with other of his writings, his foremost concern as an independent free-thinking intellectual was to provide a catalyst for forward-looking change in the Arab world, which he considered vital to the struggle for justice and freedom in Palestine.

One of the issues that most troubled Said in this respect was the manner in which Arab regimes and official Arab institutions expressed their opposition to Zionism and Israel. From 1948 onward, this opposition took the form of a total rejection
and boycott of the “Zionist entity,” a pretender-state and imperial usurper of Arab patrimony and rights, the struggle against which was the paramount duty of every Arab citizen—man, woman, and child. Said strongly criticized this policy as a hopeless, bankrupt approach to dealing with what Israel and Zionism had wrought on the Palestinian and Arab peoples. He believed that this approach had contributed to the gradual militarization, despotism, and tyranny of the Arab state system in the post-1948 period. In *The Question of Palestine*, Said derided this image of Israel perpetuated in the Arab world:

Israel has tended to appear as an entirely negative entity, something constructed for us for no other reason than either to keep Arabs out or to subjugate them. The internal solidarity and cohesion of Israel, of Israelis as a people and as a society, have for the most part eluded the understanding of Arabs generally. Thus to the walls constructed by Zionism have been added walls constructed by a dogmatic, almost theological brand of Arabism. Israel has seemed essentially to be a rhetorical tool provided by the West to harass the Arabs. What this perception entailed in the Arab states has been a policy of repression and a kind of thought control. For years it was forbidden ever to refer to Israel in print; this sort of censorship led quite naturally to the consolidation of police states, the absence of freedom of expression, and a whole set of human rights abuses, all supposedly justified in the name of “fighting Zionist aggression,” which meant that any form of oppression at home was acceptable because it served the “sacred cause” of “national security.”

As an alternative to this “policy of repression” and “thought control,” Said counseled an open and frank engagement with Israel (“what earthly use is there in pretending that it doesn’t exist?” he wondered), and with its principal sponsor, the United States. The intention was not only to escape the shroud of ignorance in which the Arab states had enveloped their societies as regards these two formidable powers in their midst, but just as importantly, to remove the pretense of the daunting enemy at the gates, thereby opening up internal Arab governing structures and policies to public scrutiny and accountability for the manner in which they had for far too long held their own citizens in utter contempt. In this respect, Said often wrote of the need for Arabs to seriously study Israel and the United States, to undo having “literally made [the Arab world] more passive, more unable to respond to what America and Israel unilaterally decide to do” in the region. Likewise, he decried the punishment by various Arab states of the few people in the Arab world—journalists, academics, literary figures, and the like—who dared to follow the call to engage Israel as a reality or who simply recognized the obvious futility in continuing to ignore it; he called the so-called “crime” of “normalization” a “stupid concept” that had been “overused either to divert attention from Arab indifference to the Palestinians or to attack other Arabs or to promote ignorance.” Tellingly, the matter of confronting Israel’s existence was, for Said, symptomatic of a larger problem: “At issue is the right to free thought and expression and, under-
lying that, the right to be free of ludicrously enacted restrictions against individual freedom.”86 It was therefore little wonder that in From Oslo to Iraq he expressed his deep consternation with how “such rubrics as homosexuality, atheism, extremism, terrorism, and fundamentalism have been overused much of the time without sufficient care or nuance, just so that critics of the ruling groups could be silenced or imprisoned.”87 He then issued the following sober warning, no less important for its call for ordinary citizens in the Arab world to speak truth to power than for the glimpse it offered into the seriousness with which he took universal values and justice:

As the Arab world spins into further incoherence and shame, it is up to every one of us to speak up against these terrible abuses of power. No one is safe unless every citizen protests what in effect is a reversion to medieval practices of autocracy. If we accuse Israel of what it has done to the Palestinians, we must be willing to apply exactly the same standards of behavior to our own countries. This norm is as true for the American as for the Arab and the Israeli intellectual, who must criticize human rights abuses from a universal point of view, not simply when they occur within the domain of an officially designated enemy. Our own cause is strengthened when we take positions that can be applied to all situations, without conditions such as saying “I disagree with his views, but” as a way of lessening the difficulty and the onus of speaking out. The truth is that, as Arabs, all we have left now is the power of speaking out, and unless we exercise that right, the slide into terminal degeneration cannot ever be stopped. The hour is very late.88

Of course, the urgency of this call to speak out was most present in Said’s disparagement and condemnation of PLO decision making leading up to and following the conclusion of the DOP. For Said, the Oslo Accords were a “Palestinian capitulation” to Israeli power, a disaster of epic proportions, second only to the Nakba of 1948.89 After decades of Palestinian dispossession, exile, colonization, and persecution, he could not bear the idea that the best that could be achieved was Israel’s halfhearted recognition of the PLO and the establishment of a quasi-autonomous local authority over Palestinian towns and villages in the OPT. This “solution” effectively relieved Israel of the burden of such oversight (which, as the occupying power, it is legally obligated to ensure while leaving the occupation intact. In his analysis, the only thing the Palestinians received at Oslo was “a series of municipal responsibilities in Bantustans controlled from the outside by Israel,” whereas Israel had secured “official Palestinian consent to Israeli occupation.”90 As for the core Palestinian rights—political self-determination, an end to the occupation, sovereignty in East Jerusalem, the return of the refugees—these were, and continue to be, unaddressed, left to some future round of negotiations—when, where, and between whom no one really knows.

Although many people early on doubted that these would be the bitter fruits of Oslo, history proved Said correct. For this great “surrender” of Palestinian rights, Said never forgave Yasir Arafat, his small coterie of Oslo “negotiators,” or the rest
of the PLO functionaries who returned from exile in Tunis to assist in the endeavor. In his scathing criticism of the pro-Oslo PLO leadership, one is reminded of Frantz Fanon’s reflections on the “pitfalls of national consciousness” in his classic work, *The Wretched of the Earth*: “The battle against colonialism does not run straight away along the lines of nationalism. . . . It so happens that the unpreparedness of the educated classes, the lack of practical links between them and the mass of the people, their laziness, and let it be said, their cowardice at the decisive moment of the struggle will give rise to tragic mishaps.”

For Said, the “tragic mishap” for the Palestinians was Oslo, and he was unrelenting in calling to account those Palestinian leaders who were responsible for it. In *Peace and its Discontents*, he noted,

> After laboriously constructing the unity of Palestinians everywhere, bringing together the Diaspora and the 800,000 Palestinian citizens of Israel, as well as the residents of the occupied territories, the PLO by a stroke of the pen [i.e., at Oslo] split the three components apart, accepting the Israeli designation of Palestinians as only the encaged residents of the territories. No other liberation movement in the twentieth century got so little—roughly 5 percent of its territory. And no other leaders of a liberation movement accepted what in effect is permanent subordination of their people. . . . Arafat and his Palestinian Authority have become a sort of Vichy government for the Palestinians. Those of us who fought for Palestine before Oslo fought for a cause that we believed would spur the emergence of a just order. Never has this ideal been further from realization today.

As life for the Palestinians of the OPT seriously deteriorated during the Oslo years, Said lamented that the PA had “become a byword for brutality, autocracy and unimaginable corruption,” not to mention a collaborative tool of Israel in the consolidation of its hold over the OPT and, ultimately, over Palestinian lives. Increasingly, Said focused his criticism on Arafat’s leadership, openly questioning the competence, intentions, and integrity of the man who had previously enjoyed the intellectual’s support and loyalty ("I felt that Arafat was genuinely a representative of Palestinian nationalism, far transcending his actual role as a human being,” he said). Like Fanon’s warning against so-called anticolonial nationalists who “mobilize the people with slogans of independence, and for the rest leave it to future events,” Said decried Arafat’s continual “abuse,” in the absence of a detailed plan, of “old slogans like ‘a Palestinian state’ and ‘Jerusalem our capital’” when Oslo had in fact brought the Palestinians farther from, not nearer to, those goals. So harsh was Said’s criticism of Oslo and the PLO that in August 1996, the PA minister of information (and subsequent coauthor of the highly touted Geneva Initiative), Yaser Abed Rabbo, banned Said’s books in the OPT on the orders of Arafat. The following passage in *From Oslo to Iraq*, written during the Second Intifada, is indicative of
the view Said had come to hold of Arafat and of the quality of Palestinian leadership around him after Oslo:

Arafat is finished: why don’t we admit that he can neither lead, nor plan, nor do anything that makes any difference except to him and his Oslo cronies who have benefited materially from their people’s misery? He is the main obstacle to our people’s future. All the polls show that his presence blocks whatever forward movement might be possible . . . A leader must lead the resistance, reflect the realities on the ground, respond to his people’s needs, plan, think, and expose himself to the same dangers and difficulties that everyone else experiences. The struggle for liberation from Israeli occupation is where every Palestinian worth anything now stands: Oslo cannot be restored or repackaged as Arafat and Company might desire. It’s over for them, and the sooner they pack and get out, the better for everyone.98

Unlike its predecessor of 1987–92, the Second Intifada was accurately regarded by Said as “an intifada against Oslo and against the people who constructed it,” including Arafat and his back-room negotiators. Said was unrelenting in his belief that these people should now have the decency to stand before their people, admit their mistakes, and ask (if they can get it) for popular support if they have a plan. If there isn’t one (as I suspect), they should then have the elementary courtesy at least to say so. Only by doing this can there be anything more than tragedy at the end of the road . . . They must now explain publicly what they thought they were doing [through Oslo] and why they did it. Then they must let us express our views on their actions and their future. And for once they must listen and try to put the general interest before their own, despite the millions of dollars they have either squandered or squirreled away in Paris apartments and valuable real estate and lucrative business deals with Israel. Enough is enough.99

Of course, the spirit in which Said presented these and other criticisms of Arafat’s rule was very different from that of the disingenuous demands currently en vogue in Western diplomatic circles—demands for “PA reform” or “Hamas recognition of Israel” as a prerequisite for a resumption of the “peace” process with scarcely a word about the centrally important issue of Israel’s decades-old military occupation of Palestinian land, which “remains more or less in place.”100 Rather, he sought a complete and total winding up of the PA, along with Oslo, and perhaps more importantly, the collective defeatist mind-set of Palestinian leadership that he believed had led to the problem in the first place. In a ringing tone similar to that of Biko’s call for South Africans to embrace Black Consciousness in their struggle against apartheid, Said derided “the sense of capitulation toward Israel and the United States . . . now so prevalent among our political elites,” which “derives in the end from an absence of self-confidence,” “a spirit of passivity,” a mentality of “servility,” and, alas, “a total absence of self-knowledge.”101 In calling for a new leadership and daring to hope for a brighter future despite the compounded difficulties created by
Oslo, he reminded his people that it was not enough to demand that Arafat and his PA hangers-on “resign as incompetent but that any future leaders must have a sense of self-dignity as well as a real knowledge of Israel and the United States. What we must have in other words are decolonized minds, not men and women who can neither liberate themselves nor their own people.” The most important indication that Palestinians in the OPT may have taken this message to heart was the landslide victory of Hamas in the Palestinian Legislative Council (the legislative branch of the PA) in January 2006. Said, of course, was no Islamist. But few can question that the election results were a complete vindication of his critique of the Palestinian leadership under the ousted nationalist Fatah party, whose personalities were responsible for Oslo and its dreadful aftermath.

SAID AS VISIONARY

Said did not, of course, embark on the criticism of power merely for criticism’s sake. The point behind it all was to find a better way of thinking and approach, to constructively move on, and in a manner that would guarantee peace and justice for Palestinians and Israelis alike. In addition to embracing his roles as narrator and critic, Said possessed a unique ability not only to identify, broadly speaking, what needed to be done to achieve peace and justice but perhaps more importantly to articulate it—and to do so long before such ideas became the accepted norm in political, diplomatic, and media circles.

At the base of Said’s vision was his unyielding belief in the “unassailable” morality and justness of the Palestinian cause. The problem for the Palestinians, he believed, was that they had for far too long been abandoned by the international community and, in more recent years, severely ill served by their leaders. Throughout his writings, particularly in the last decade of his life, Said made little secret of the influence that the South African liberation struggle had on his worldview, in particular, what he came to believe was “the only alternative” to continued conflict in Palestine/Israel. At the heart of this alternative was the proposition that in order “to counteract Zionist exclusivism,” the Palestinians would have to seize the moral high ground just as Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress (ANC) had, to “assert our common humanity as Jews and Arabs.” Although the Israelis had power without end to deploy against the Palestinians, and although the dispossessed, colonized, and occupied Palestinian people had a legal and moral (though not absolute) right to resist by force if necessary, continued violence was not a realistic or useful option for either party. On this point, Said was unequivocal: “Neither the Palestinians nor the Israelis have a military option against each other. Both peoples must learn to live in peace, and in mutual acknowledgement of each other’s history and actuality.” And as much as he denounced Israeli violence against his people, Said was equally as adamant about condemning Palestin-
ian violence against Israeli civilians. He often made it a point to indicate that although he considered suicide bombings to be a direct “result of years of abuse, powerlessness, and despair,” these acts were “reprehensible” and could never “be part of a program for national revival since what they promote is negation for its own sake.”\(^\text{107}\) Said was keenly aware that even “a just cause can easily be subverted by evil or inadequate or corrupt means.”\(^\text{108}\)

It was in recognition of the futility of violence, the failures of Oslo, and of the fact that in such a world the task of bringing peace to this particular region could not reasonably be entrusted to any Israeli or American leader, nor to the likes of the old-guard PLO leadership, that Said called for “a different avenue of approach.”\(^\text{109}\) This required the sort of mass, grassroots, international, and nonviolent mobilization of Palestinians that had, in Said’s view, never really been tried before.

Successful liberation movements were successful precisely because they employed creative ideas, original ideas, imaginative ideas, whereas less successful movements (like ours, alas) had a pronounced tendency to use formulas and an uninspired repetition of past slogans and past patterns of behavior. Take as a primary instance the idea of armed struggle. For decades we have relied in our minds on ideas about guns and killing, ideas that from the 1930s until today have brought us plentiful martyrs but have had little real effect either on Zionism or on our own ideas about what to do next. In our case, the fighting is done by a small brave number of people pitted against hopeless odds: stones against helicopter gunships, Merkava tanks, missiles. Yet a quick look at other movements—say, the Indian nationalist movement, the South African liberation movement, the American civil rights movement—tells us first of all that only a mass movement employing tactics and strategy that maximizes the popular element ever makes any difference on the occupier and/or oppressor. . . . Only a mass movement that has been politicized and imbued with a vision of participating directly in a future of its own making, only such a movement has a historical chance of liberating itself from oppression or military occupation.\(^\text{110}\)

Thus, with the South African parallel in mind, Said counseled the Palestinian people to energetically seek out global partnerships with other peoples from whom a nonviolent liberation struggle in Palestine could draw strength, most importantly “the partnership of like-minded Israelis and diaspora Jews who understand that you cannot have occupation and dispossession as well as peace with the Palestinian people.”\(^\text{111}\) Peace and reconciliation was clearly dependent on the success of such a Jewish-Palestinian partnership, and believing the “moral dimension” to be “our only field of struggle,” Said recognized that the initiative would have to come from the militarily and politically weaker Palestinian side, whose case “gains its moral stature by its humane dimensions, its sincere willingness for coexistence, its firm belief in respecting the rights of others.”\(^\text{112}\) To this end, Said emphasized that Palestinians “must show Israel and its supporters that only a full acknowledgement by them of what was done to us can bring peace and reconciliation,” but “also that we must al-
ways be very clear in our understanding of Jewish suffering and in making it apparent that what binds us together is a common history of persecution."\(^{113}\) This common history represented a bridging narrative of sorts, whereby “Jewish tragedy,” epitomized by the Nazi holocaust of the Jews, “led directly to the Palestinian catastrophe” in 1948—neither “equal to the other” but each equally worthy of reverence and understanding by the other.\(^{114}\) In the end, Said asserted that the “only way of rising beyond the endless back-and-forth violence and dehumanization is to admit the universality and integrity of the other’s experience and to begin to plan a common life together.”\(^ {115}\)

Said first articulated his vision of that common life in 1980, when he first publicly advocated a two-state solution based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and a division of mandatory Palestine between the Jews and Arabs.\(^ {116}\) At the time, and although discussion of such ideas had taken place within PLO circles as early as 1974, the notion was dismissed by Israel, which had complete control over all of historical Palestine; and by most Palestinians, who continued to insist on the complete liberation of the country and the establishment of a democratic, secular state for all its inhabitants, Arab and Jew. Although Said believed that the Palestinian people were justified in rejecting the original partition of Palestine in U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, given their status as indigenous inhabitants and their numerical superiority over the Zionist settler community (the Palestinians then constituted two-thirds of the population and owned 96 percent of the land), his pragmatism and desire for peace compelled him to recognize the need for two independent states to coexist in the land: “I accept it because I consider it to be a reality . . . I don’t believe in dispossessioning people; you’d have to find a mode of sharing.”\(^ {117}\)

For his espousal of the two-state solution, Said was “attacked from all sides,” including both the Israeli and Palestinian.\(^ {118}\) Nonetheless, the outbreak of the First Intifada in December 1987 and the subsequent adoption by the PNC of the two-state solution at its nineteenth session in Algiers in November 1988 provided him with added impetus to advance his convictions. From that point on, the “nub of the question,” as he put it, was “the end of the occupation, since national self-determination, from either the Israeli or the Palestinian point of view, is incompatible with the domination of one people by another, in which one people enjoys all the rights, the other none.”\(^ {119}\) If peace were to become reality, Israelis had to be convinced of the imperative of ending the occupation and making way for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip:

Palestinians present themselves as interlocutors with the Israelis for peace. We are not an inconsiderable people, and our achievements in education, business, science, and engineering testify to intelligence, will and foresight. We say to the Israelis and to their U.S. friends, live with us, but not on top of us. Your logic, by which you forecast an endless siege, is doomed, the way all colonial adventures have been doomed. We know
that Israelis possess a heritage of suffering, and that the Holocaust looms large over their present thought. But we Palestinians cannot be expected merely to submit to military rule and the denial of our human and political rights, particularly since our attachment to Palestine is as significant, as deep and as lasting as theirs. Therefore we must together formulate the modes of coexistence, of mutuality and sharing, those modes that can take us beyond fear and suffering into the future, and an extraordinarily interesting and impressive future at that.120

Eventually, the “two-state” vision espoused by Said was accepted by every major party to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Israelis and the Americans: it became the basis for negotiations first at Madrid in 1991 and then at Oslo in 1993. Since that time, the diplomatic community has embraced the notion of the “two-state solution” as the only acceptable basis for the “final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict.”121

The onset of the Oslo process and its attendant effects on the landscape of Palestinian space in the OPT compelled Said to rethink his views on the two-state solution. While the notion of shared sovereignty in two separate states presupposed a mutual respect for the territorial integrity of the neighboring state, Said pointed to Israel’s massive geographic and demographic transformation of the OPT in the years following the conclusion of the DOP as effectively having spoiled any possibility of an independent, contiguous, and viable Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. A series of developments between 1993 and 2006 led him to this conclusion: a massive influx of Israeli settlers into the OPT, causing their number to more than double, from some 200,000 to well over 400,000; the rapid construction of hundreds of kilometers of additional settler-only bypass roads connecting the settlements with Israel; the presence of some 200 Israeli military bases/posts throughout the OPT; the erection of the wall; the destruction of the Palestinian village-road network; and the imposition of a complex regime of closures, curfews, and a South-African style “permit system” that severely limited Palestinian freedom of movement. As a result, the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank were confined in “227 non-contiguous islands,” and the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip were left to fester in one of the most densely populated and impoverished places on earth.122 According to the U.N. special rapporteur on human rights in the OPT, John Dugard, this situation led to the development of “an apartheid regime worse than the one that existed in South Africa.”123

As Said saw these events unfold, he abandoned the two-state solution in favor of an idea that he considered “the only long-term solution” to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: one state for Jews and Arabs—a binational state—that would inhabit all of the former Mandate of Palestine.124 In Power, Politics, and Culture, he explained that any attempt to solve the problem by carving a Palestinian state out of the remains of the OPT is doomed to fail “because the Israelis have now sunk their tentacles on the land of [the] Palestinians”:
By their own aggressive zeal, the settler movement and the Israeli government and army have in fact involved themselves so deeply in Palestinian life that in my opinion there is no separation between them, or only the separation of apartheid. But demographically there are two populations living together. In about ten years there will be demographic parity [between Palestinians and Israelis living within Mandate Palestine]. Therefore the only conclusion to be drawn from this is to devise a means where the two peoples can live together in one nation as equals—not as master and slave, which is the current situation.125

For Said, the equation was simple: because Israeli colonization of the OPT had been so effective in integrating the West Bank and Gaza Strip into Israel, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state had effectively been rendered a nonoption (at best it would be “a tiny rump; it’s not worth it,” Said wrote).126 If one factored in the Palestinians’ economic dependence on Israel and the projected demographic parity between Jews and Arabs in Mandate Palestine, one could hardly dismiss the inevitability of the one-state model. Of course, Said was not naive. He well understood the considerable obstacles in the way of establishing such a state, not least of which, in his view, was the strength of respective Israeli and Palestinian nationalisms, the former with its emphasis on the need to protect the “Jewish character” of the state and the latter with its long-felt desire to exercise sovereignty freely in its own land. Nevertheless, Said’s “sense of realism” led him to conclude in the last decade of his life that “the only way this problem is going to be settled, as in South Africa, is to face the reality squarely on the basis of coexistence and equality,” one person–one vote, and equality for all.127 “I know it seems like a long shot,” he said, “but I think within the working out of the history and the unfolding of time, it becomes a more and more attractive idea.”128

Unlike his vision and advocacy of the two-state solution, Said’s one-state vision of peace did not see widespread acceptance among the international community during his lifetime. Nevertheless, he was correct that it would become “more and more attractive” over time. During the past decade, the idea has taken root among a significant number of thoughtful people on both sides of the conflict, and it has even gained favorable attention among some of the Palestinian political elite.129 Although the future of the one-state solution remains unclear, an objective consideration of each of the variables that compelled Said to adopt it reveals the potential power and attractiveness of the idea, not to mention the extent of Said’s foresight in identifying it and articulating it for us as resolutely as he did.

CONCLUSION

The late Palestinian jurist Henry Cattan wrote, “Just as a disease cannot be treated without knowledge of its cause, so also the Palestine Question cannot be resolved
unless there exists a full and proper knowledge of its dimensions.” More than any other individual of his generation, Edward Said contributed to the advancement of knowledge about every dimension of the Palestine problem, leaving an indelible mark on those who genuinely desire that peace and justice be done in the Middle East. At the heart of his approach was his deeply held belief in the duty of the intellectual to be a contrarian force in a world that has too often seen the unscrupulous exercise of power. His call to speak truth to power was not merely directed at ivory-tower elites; it was also a rallying cry, an attempt to awake in one and all a culture of dissent. Said believed that such a culture was critical to the healthy development of humanistic, democratic, universal values upon which the freedom and cooperation of all peoples rest.

To this end, Said’s tripartite role as narrator, critic, and visionary in addressing the Palestinian freedom struggle was interwoven with the intellectual imperative to speak truth to power. The quintessential exile, Said always sought to stand apart from the interests of authority, which, in turn, provided him with the intellectual and public space in which to call authority to account. Although none of this activity earned him widespread popularity among the elite, Said was unmoved by such considerations and pressed on to narrate Palestinian presence and criticize Zionist, American, and Palestinian policy makers, all the while daring to envision a better future for them all. His main goal throughout was to seek justice and freedom for the Palestinian people, based on principles of universalism, humanism, law, and morality, and to do so in a manner respectful of the same interests and rights of their main protagonists, the Jewish people of Israel. His was a world in which everyone mattered equally and had to be treated as such if a durable and tangible peace was to be forged. Whether or not Said’s considerable work in this field will yield the fruits it merits is unknown. What is known, however, is the scope and seriousness of the challenge he put to us all: that women and men of conscience must continue to speak truth to power so that power’s victims might have their stories told, their histories acknowledged, and their rights to liberty, justice, and freedom realized.

NOTES

The opinions I express here are exclusively mine and do not represent the opinions or views of the United Nations organization or of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).

2. Ibid., 85.
3. Ibid., 92.
4. Ibid., 93.
5. Ibid., 97.
9. Ibid., 52–53 (emphasis added).
10. It is telling that Biko chose to name the column in which most of his writings appeared “I Write What I Like,” the title eventually given to the book containing his most pivotal work. Although Biko was forced to write the column under a pen name because of the strict South African laws prohibiting free speech, his refusal to allow the authorities to censor his thoughts personifies the type of fortitude that Said demanded of intellectuals as critics of power.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. In 1918, there were approximately 700,000 Palestinians, and only 56,000 of them claimed Jewish religious identification. See T. Mallison and S. Mallison, The Palestine Problem in International Law and World Order (London: Longman, 1986), 25.
17. Balfour Declaration, as quoted in Mallison and Mallison, The Palestine Problem, 427 (emphasis added).
18. Nemo dat quod non habet: a principle of English common law that “one cannot give what one does not possess.”
22. Ibid., 16.
23. Ibid., 18.
33. Ibid., 12.
37. Ibid.
38. Said, _Orientalism_, 27.
39. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Said, _The Question of Palestine_, 69.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., 125.
49. For instance, in _The Question of Palestine_, Said notes, "For whatever it may have done for Jews, Zionism essentially saw Palestine as the European imperialist did, as an empty territory paradoxically ‘filled’ with ignoble or perhaps even dispensable natives; it allied itself, as Chaim Weizmann quite clearly said after World War I, with imperial powers in carrying out its plans for establishing a new Jewish state in Palestine, and it did not think except in negative terms of ‘the natives,’ who were passively supposed to accept the plans made for their land; . . . in formulating the concept of a Jewish nation ‘reclaiming’ its own territory, Zionism not only accepted the generic racial concepts of European culture, it also banked on the fact that Palestine was actually populated not by an advanced but by a backward people, over which it ought to be dominant" (81–82).
52. A perfect example of this aspect of Said’s approach to Zionism is his critique of Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” thesis, in which, Said wrote, the “personification of enormous entities called ‘the West’ and ‘Islam’ is recklessly affirmed as if hugely complicated matters like identity and culture existed in a cartoonlike world where Popeye and Bluto bash each other mercilessly, with one always more virtuous pugilist getting the upper hand over his adversary.” Said derided Huntington for having little “time to spare for the internal dynamics and plurality of every civilization, or for the fact that the major contest in most modern cultures concerns the definition or interpretation of each culture, or for the unattractive possibility that a great deal of demagogy and downright ignorance is involved in presuming to speak for a whole religion or civilization. No, the West is the West, and Islam Islam”; E. W. Said, _From Oslo to Iraq and the Road Map_ (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004), 119–20.
57. Said, _The Question of Palestine_, 77.
58. Ibid.
59. This mind-set, Said noted in _From Oslo to Iraq_, allows one to make sense of the Israeli insistence
on continuing to colonize the very territory from which it claimed it intended to withdraw during the Oslo process. If, on the one hand, peace requires handing the OPT over to the Palestinian people, then why the persistence in constructing settlements, building bypass roads, demolishing homes, and confiscating land? What explains, to use Said’s words, this “total irreconcilability with what the Jewish state wants—peace and security, even though everything it does assures neither one nor the other” (128)? He suggested that the answer lay in the continuing and unyielding influence of the idea of Zionism on Israel’s leaders and institutions, who apparently have been unable to reconcile themselves with the folly of it all.

60. Ibid., 21–23.
62. Ibid., 207.
65. Under the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Taba, 28 September 1995) 36 ILM. 531 (1997) [hereafter Interim Agreement], the PA was to exercise internal security and civil authority in Area A and Israel was to exercise external security authority. In Area B, the PA would exercise civil and limited security authority, and Israel would exercise overarching internal security authority. Finally, Area C would be under complete Israeli authority.
67. Portions of the Gaza Strip constitute a limited exception to this 2002 Israeli encroachment. In the area, a coterie of PA, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other smaller armed Palestinian groups vied for control until Hamas took over in June 2007. In August and September 2005, the state of Israel withdrew its settlers and permanent military installations and forces from the Gaza Strip in a unilateral act it termed “disengagement.” Israel has since asserted that its occupation of the Gaza Strip has come to an end, including its corresponding international legal obligations toward the Palestinian civilian population. The Israeli position notwithstanding, under the law governing foreign military occupation, the Gaza Strip remains occupied territory and Israel the occupying power. Under international law, occupation of a territory is determined by the “effective control test,” which is spelled out in article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Behrens 631; entered into force 26 January 1910). Article 42 provides that “territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.” In applying this test, the following guidelines apply: (a) the number and distribution of occupying forces in the territory is immaterial to the question of continued effective control (thus, territory can be controlled through all or a combination of air and sea power and deployment of limited ground forces the perimeter; (b) the existence of local/indigenous authorities administering portions of the territory does not preclude the continued effective control of an occupying power over the whole of the territory (for example, through administrative control over the population); and (c) so long as an occupying power retains the ability to exercise effective authority over territory from which it has withdrawn, that territory remains occupied. Despite the removal of Israeli settlers and military installations from the Gaza Strip, the state of Israel has re-

68. Quote from Interim Agreement, article 31(7).

69. Said, From Oslo to Iraq, 128. On the illegality of the wall in the West Bank, see "Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory," Advisory Opinion (ICJ, 9 July 2004), 43 ILM 1009.


72. See note 67.

73. Said, Peace and Its Discontents, 89.

74. Ibid., 88.

75. Said, From Oslo to Iraq, 128.


79. Said, From Oslo to Iraq, 38.

80. Ibid., 280.

81. Ibid., 282.


83. Said, From Oslo to Iraq, 82.

84. Said, Peace and Its Discontents, 89–90. In one of his many exhortations about the need for Arab study of Israel and the United States, Said wrote, “I find it puzzling that given American and Israeli hegemony in the region there is still not a single university department in any Arab country, including the Occupied Palestinian Territories, in which American and Israeli societies are studied and taught” (89).

85. Said, From Oslo to Iraq, 82.

86. Ibid., 82–83.

87. Ibid., 83.
88. Ibid., 83–84.
89. Said, Peace and Its Discontents, 7. Nakba is Arabic for "catastrophe." Palestinians use the term to describe the fall of Palestine in 1948 and the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian nation from its historical homeland.
91. Ibid.
94. Said, From Oslo to Iraq. 184.
96. Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 150; Said, From Oslo to Iraq. 28.
98. Said, From Oslo to Iraq. 96–97.
99. Ibid., 31.
100. Ibid., 279–80.
102. Ibid., 99.
104. Said, From Oslo to Iraq. 48–51.
105. Ibid., 50.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid., 29–30.
111. Ibid., 41.
113. Ibid., 197–98.
114. Ibid., 207.
115. Ibid., 208.
116. T. Judt, foreword to Said, From Oslo to Iraq. xv.
118. Judt, foreword, From Oslo to Iraq. xv.
120. Ibid.
126. Ibid.
127. Ibid., 435.
128. Ibid.
