Benjamin Ewing is an Assistant Professor at Queen’s Law. Prior to joining Queen’s, he was a Visiting Assistant Professor at Duke University School of Law. He earned his PhD in Politics from Princeton University, his JD from Yale Law School, and his AB in Applied Mathematics-Economics from Brown University, where he graduated magna cum laude. At Princeton, Ewing was a Laurance S. Rockefeller Graduate Prize Fellow in the University Center for Human Values. While a law student at Yale, he was a Coker Fellow and, in the fall of 2009, a research assistant to Associate Justice Stephen Breyer of the Supreme Court of the United States.
In his scholarship, Ewing analyzes the moral and political foundations of different forms of legal responsibility for wrongdoing, particularly criminal punishment. He is especially interested in what it means to have a fair opportunity to avoid crime and punishment. He has developed a distinctive interpretation of fair opportunity to avoid crime that helps explain, among other things, the moral significance at sentencing of whether a defendant came from an unfairly disadvantaged background or committed prior offenses.
- 2023. “Reconstructing Gladue,“ University of Toronto Law Journal (with Lisa Kerr) (forthcoming)
- 2023. “Mass Incarceration as Distributive Injustice,” in The Palgrave Handbook on the Philosophy of Punishment, ed. Matthew C. Altman (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan)
- 2023. “Do Unjust States Have the Standing to Blame? Three Reservations About Scepticism,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 43(2): 249-72
- 2023. “Criminal Responsibility and Fair Moral Opportunity,” Criminal Law and Philosophy 17(2): 291-316
- 2019. “Mitigating Factors: A Typology,” in The Palgrave Handbook of Applied Ethics and the Criminal Law, ed. Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, 423-42 (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan)
- 2019. “Prior Convictions as Moral Opportunities,” American Journal of Criminal Law 46(2): 283-332
- 2018. “Recent Work on Punishment and Criminogenic Disadvantage,” Law and Philosophy 37(1): 29-68
- 2017. “Conventionality, Disagreement, and Fidelity,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 30(1): 97-123
- 2015. “The Structure of Tort Law, Revisited: The Problem of Corporate Responsibility,” Journal of Tort Law 8(1-2): 1-28 (reviewed in Gregory Keating, “Are Corporations Responsible Agents?,” Jotwell)
- 2015. “The Political Legitimacy of Retribution: Two Reasons for Skepticism,” Law and Philosophy 34(4): 369-96
- 2011. “Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm,” Yale Law Journal 121(2): 350-424 (with Douglas A. Kysar)