Jacob Weinrib is an Associate Professor at the Queen’s Faculty of Law. He graduated from the Combined JD/PhD Program in Law and Philosophy at the University of Toronto, where he studied as a Vanier Scholar and received the David Savan Dissertation Prize. Before joining Queen’s Law, he held a SSHRC Postdoctoral Fellowship at the New York University School of Law as a Global Hauser Research Fellow in the Center for Constitutional Transitions (2013-4) and as a Dworkin-Balzan Fellow in the Center for Law and Philosophy (2014-2015). Weinrib is the author of Dimensions of Dignity: The Theory and Practice of Modern Constitutional Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). He is currently working on two major projects. The first, which is supported by a SSHRC Insight Development Grant, formulates a rights-based account of the theoretical foundations of administrative law. The second is a short book entitled Rights, Limits, and Proportionality: A Short Guide for the Perplexed (under contract with Cambridge University Press). Weinrib was the 2018-2019 recipient of the Corbett Award for Teaching Excellence.
Weinrib’s research lies at the intersection of legal philosophy and public law. His overarching aim is to formulate a unified theory of the normative, institutional, and doctrinal dimensions of public law.
Dimensions of Dignity: The Theory and Practice of Modern Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Studies in Constitutional Law series, 2016). [Amazon] [Cambridge]
TRS Allan, (2018) 68.2 University of Toronto Law Journal 312.
Pavlos Eleftheriadis, “In Defence of Constitutional Law,” (2018) 81.1 Modern Law Review 154.
AEM Leijten, (2017) 4 Tijdschrift voor Constitutioneel Recht 346
Book Symposium, (2020) 11:2 Jurisprudence 243
Articles and Book Chapters<
- “Maitland's Challenge to Administrative Legal Theory” (2021) 84:2 Modern Law Review 207-229 [SSRN]
- “The Frank Dissent’s Charter Framework: The Rhetoric and the Reality” (2021) 100 Supreme Court Law Review 85-103 [SSRN]
- “Dignity’s Constitution: A Reply” (2020) 11(2) Jurisprudence 298-398 (symposium on Dimensions of Dignity) [SSRN]
- “Dignity and Autonomy” in Rainer Grote, Frauke Lachenmann, and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press) [SSRN]
- “Rights in Search of Protection” (2020) 40 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 403-423 [SSRN]
- “Sovereignty as a Right and as a Duty” in Claire Finkelstein and Michael Skerker (eds) Sovereignty and the New Executive Authority (Oxford: University Press, forthcoming). [SSRN] [Academia.edu]
- “The Principles of Constitutional Reform” (2019) 24(4) (Special Issue on Kant and Law) Kantian Review 631-651 [SSRN][Academia.edu]
- “Human Dignity and its Critics” in Jacobsohn and Schor, eds, Comparative Constitutional Theory (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2018) 167-186 [SSRN] [Academia.edu]
- “When Trumps Clash: Dworkin and the Doctrine of Proportionality” (2017) 30 Ratio Juris 341-352 [SSRN][Academia.edu]
[This article has been translated into Spanish: “Cuando las cartas del triunfo chocan: Dworkin y la Doctrina de la Proporcionalidad” in Marcelo Alegre, ed, El imperio de Ronald Dworkin: ensayos de filosofía moral, política y jurídica (Buenos Aires: Departamento de Publicaciones, Facultad de Derecho Universidad de Buenos Aires, 2019) 175-186 [Academia.edu]]
- “Authority, Justice, and Public Law: A Unified Theory” (2014) 64 University of Toronto Law Journal 703-735 [SSRN] [Academia.edu]
- “The Modern Constitutional State: A Defense” (2014) 40 Queen’s Law Journal 165-212 [SSRN] cited in R. v. C.P. 2021 SCC 19 at para 116
- “What can Kant Teach us about Legal Classification?” (2010) 23:1 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 203 [SSRN]
- “What is the Purpose of Freedom of Expression?” (2009) 67 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 165, cited in Toronto (City) v. Ontario (Attorney General) 2021 SCC 34 at paras 128, 156
- “Kant on Citizenship” (2008) 33 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1 [SSRN] (winner of Australian Society of Legal Philosophy Essay Prize)
- “The Juridical Significance of Kant’s ‘Supposed Right to Lie’” (2008) 13:1 Kantian Review 141-170 [SSRN]
- “What is Purposive Interpretation?”
- Rights, Limits, and Proportionality: A Short Guide for the Perplexed (under contract with Cambridge University Press)